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COURT OF APPEALS JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of appeals obtains jurisdiction of this 
case through my Notice of Appeal (record p. 101) pursuant to 
UCA 78-4-11. Also under Article I, Section 12, and Article 
VII, Section 5 of the Utah State Constitution. 
Ill 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
POINT I - JURISDICTION OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
When jurisdiction is challenged on a criminal issue, the 
prosecution must respond by providing sufficient evidence 
to establish the Courts clear jurisdiction before it can 
properly proceed with the case 
iii 
POINT II - MISAPPLICATION OF THE STATUTE 
UCA 41-2-124 applies to licensees only. Persons who have 
not applied for and been awarded a drivers license are 
not subject to its provisions. 
POINT III - INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
Before a defendant can be properly found guilty of an 
alleged crime, it must be proven during trial that he did 
indeed commit the alleged injurious act. Evidence showing 
only that he may have been in a position to do the wrong 
is not sufficient to warrant a guilty ruling. 
IV 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED; 
Title 41, Chapter 2: Operators license act. 
Section 124: 
(124) The licensee shall have his license in his immediate 
possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle 
and shall display it upon demand of a justice of peace, 
a peace officer, or field deputy or inspector of the 
division. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 8. GENERAL RULES OF PLEADING 
(d) Effect of failure to deny 
iv 
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading 
is requiredf other than those as to the amount of damage, 
are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. 
Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading 
is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or 
avoided. 
Rule 81. APPLICABILITY OF RULES IN GENERAL 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings 
These rules of procedure shall also govern in any aspect 
of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable 
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does 
not conflict with any statutory or constitutional 
requirement. 
RULES OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Rule 9 Docketing Statement 
(c) Content of Docketing Statement 
The Docketing Statement shall contain the following 
information in the order set forth below: 
(2) The specific rule or statutory authority that confers 
jurisdiction on the court of appeals to decide the appeal... 
Rule 24 Briefs 
(a) Brief of Appellant 
The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
heading and in the order here indicated: 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of this 
court and describing the nature of the proceedings below. 
v 
V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case based on an amended information 
signed June 7, 1989 accusing me of the crime: 
DRIVING WITHOUT A VALID DRIVERS LICENSE, an infraction, 
in that said defendant, on or about the 20th day of March, 
1989, in Washington County, State of Utah, did drive a 
motor vehicle upon the streets of the State of Utah without 
a valid drivers license in his possession, in violation 
of Section 41-2-124, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended, 
(record p.30 ) 
Said amended information also contained a second accusation 
which was dismissed during trial. 
I deny the above accusation, challenge the Circuit Courtfs 
jurisdiction to hear this case, and challenge the applicability 
of UCA 41-2-124 in these circumstances. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case began on the morning of March 20, 1989. I had 
traveled to a small hay field in LaVerkin, Utah, and was out 
in the field irrigating when I was hailed by Deputy Officer 
Greg Newman, of the Washington County Sheriff's Department, 
from the side of the field adjacent to a city street. He said 
he wanted to ask me some questions and ordered me to come over 
•TV^VS^I T -^~4- • ~ T>~I ^-e *~~~ 1 
to answer him. By the time I reached the fencef another officer 
had arrived. Officer Newman demanded to see my drivers license, 
whereupon I demanded to know his probable cause for such demands. 
He replied that this was a traffic stop. I knew that was not 
sufficient probable cause for such questions, since the officer 
hand not stopped me on the road or in traffic, but had hailed 
me out of the hay field, so relying on my right to privacy I 
refused to answer his questions. After some other exchanges 
which are not relevant to the issue at hand, both officers 
grabbed me and slammed me face down onto the back of the vehicle 
Twisting both my wrists up to the back of my neck, they tightly 
secured some cuffs on me, then hauled me over to and strapped 
me into one of their vehicles. Eventually I was taken before 
Justice of the Peace Chester Adams in Toquerville, Utah. While 
there, Officer Newman wrote out the citation which precipitated 
this case. 
When I challenged the jurisdiction of the Justice Court, 
Magistrate Adams transferred the case to the Circuit Court. 
I filed a number of motions by special appearance, always 
challenging the Circuit Court jurisdiction. The prosecution 
did not respond to any of those motions. I was arraigned before 
the Circuit Court on June 27, 1989, at which time I refused 
to plea because the jurisdiction issue needed to be settled 
first. Magistrate Owens over ruled my jurisdictional challenges 
and entered a not guilty plea for me. 
A n n a ! 1 a n f ' e» TJ-r-*i e± "P n r s r r A O 
Trial was held August 31, 1989, at which time I again 
challenged the Court's jurisdiction. Trial did proceed over 
my objection and Judge Owens found me guilty, signing the order 
on September 5, 1989. I subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal 
:>n September 18, 1989, thus bringing this case before this 
aonorable court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. I am a free and natural citizen of the State of Utah, 
wishing to live by God given and Constitutionally guaranteed 
rights, not by privilege and franchise. Therefore, I do not 
need, nor do I have a State license of any kind. 
2. On numerous occasions during the course of these 
proceedings, I have challenged the Circuit Court's jurisdiction 
over me in these circumstances. (record p. 3,7,10,61). 
3. At no time during the proceedings has the prosecution put 
forth any argument or legal reasoning to refute my jurisdictional 
challenges. 
4. No evidence was presented which would in any way indicate 
that I am or have been involved in any activity using the public 
roads and highways for gain and profit. 
5. No evidence was presented which would in any way indicate 
that my activities on the 20th of March, 1989, caused damage 
or injury to anyonefs person or property. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I I contend that when I challenged the jurisdiction 
of the Justice Court and subsequently the Circuit Court, the 
burden of submitting sufficient evidence to overcome this 
challenge and establishing jurisdiction beyond reasonable doubt 
fell upon the prosecution. Furthermore, that since the 
prosecution failed to even respond to my timely and properly 
submitted challenges, they in effect admitted to their 
accuratenessi Therefore the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction 
to try this case. 
POINT II The word licensee like the word lessee refers to 
a specific party to a contract or agreement. Since UCA 41-2-
124 expressly applies to the licensee in a drivers license 
contract, only that specific party to that specific contract 
can be held to the provisions of this statute. I have declared, 
and the prosecution has presented evidence showing, (see 
Exhibit E) that I am not a party to the drivers license contract, 
and am therefore not subject to the provisions of said statute. 
POINT III Not all persons moving upon the public streets and 
highways are doing so for profit and gainf and therefore driving. 
Many are traveling as a matter of right; which right is an 
integral part of the constitutionally guaranteed right to 
liberty. By Supreme Court ruling, this individual right cannot 
be denied through legislative act. Therefore state drivers 
licensing acts apply to those traveling the streets and highways 
for profit and gain and not to those traveling as a matter of 
right. Consequently for one to be guilty of DRIVING WITHOUT 
A VALID DRIVERS LICENSE, it must be proven that he was indeed 
traveling for profit and gain as distinguished from one traveling 
as a matter of right. 
VI 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I JURISDICTION OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
The first question before a court when presented with 
an issue to be resolved, is whether or not it has power to 
rule in the matter. This is simple when all parties involved 
agree to the courts jurisdiction, but when one party objects 
to and challenges the courts power to act, then by our adversary 
system the opposing party must shoulder the burden of presenting 
evidence and argument toward proving proper jurisdiction. Early 
in this case I challenged the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court 
by motion (see DEMAND TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION record 
p. 7) for a number of reasons enumerated therein. There was 
no responsive pleading submitted by the prosecution, rather 
instead, the Circuit Court adopted the inquisitorial position 
and assumed its own jurisdiction, calling my arguments 
"...standard Birch motions John Birch motions, and nobody 
gives them any credit at all..." (arraignment transcript p.4) 
John Birch or not, the challenge was real and deserving 
of some sincere consideration. In fact, Rule 8(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure [which by Rule 81(e) R.C.P. apply in 
criminal proceedings] states: "Averments in a pleading to which 
a responsive pleading is required are admitted when not 
denied in the responsive pleading." The US Supreme Court has 
declared that jurisdictional challenges are one of those 
averments to which a responsive pleading is required, saying: 
"...once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven." (Hagens 
v Lavine, 415 US 533 note 3). The High Court further explains 
"....for mere good faith assertions of power and authority have 
been abolished." (Owens v Indiana 445 US 662). Even this 
Appellate Court recognizes the necessity of establishing absolute 
Appellant"s Brief page 6 
jurisdiction before proceeding when it requires statements 
showing Appellate Court jurisdiction in the Docketing Statement 
and all briefs filed [Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
09(e)(2), and 024(a)(4)]. 
Thus when the prosecution failed to respond to my legitimate 
jurisdictional challenges they admit their validity. 
Furthermore, absent the Drivers1 licensing contract (see POINT 
II), there is no connecting link which confers judicial 
jurisdiction by way of the driving statute UCA 41-2-124. 
Therefore, the Washington County Circuit Court lacked personam 
jurisdiction, and consequently erred in assuming by subsequently 
issuing a guilty ruling. Due process demands that a ruling 
so arrived at be reversed. 
POINT III MISAPPLICATION OF STATUTE 
In the case at hand I have been charged with violating 
Section 41-2-124, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended, which 
reads: 
"The licensee shall have his license in his immediate 
possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle 
and shall display it upon demand of a justice of peace, 
a peace officer or field deputy or inspector of the 
division.11 (emphasis added) 
This statute is straight forward, uncomplicated and proper 
when applied to its stated object: a licensee: but 
totally inappropriate when applied to one who is not a licensee 
as in the case at hand. A perusal of the exhibits, plaintiff's 
arguments, and court transcript will show that the plaintiff 
has assumed, but failed to provide any evidence, that I am a 
licensee. In opposition to this assumption I have declared 
in person and on paper (see: DEMAND TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION, record p. 7; and MOTION TO OVERCOME PRESUMPTION 
BY GOVERNMENT THAT DEFENDANT IS A LICENSEE, record p. 70.) 
that I am not a licensee as contemplated in UCA 41-2-124. 
Furthermore "Exhibit E,f of the prosecutor fs evidence (record 
p. 94 & Addendum #1), a document prepared under the official 
seal of the Department of Public Safety, verifies that I am 
not a licensee, SHOWING no indication that I am presently 
licensed, or applying for a license, in the State of Utah. 
I have not entered into that contract. 
Deputy Officer Newman might just as well have demanded 
to see my license to practice medicine when he hailed me out 
of the field on that March day, because I could have truthfully 
answered in the same manner. That is: I do not practice 
medicine, nor do I intend to practice medicine, therefore I 
have no need for a license to so practice. 
Reason and logic dictate that since I am not a licensee, 
UCA 41-2-124 cannot be relied upon to compel me to do anything 
mandated therein. Therefore any attempt to force me into a 
contractual performance for which there is no contract is well 
outside the realm of justice, and in fact approaches a 
deprivation of rights which is a real crime with real damages. 
For this reason the judgment of the Circuit Court should be 
reversed so that true justice may prevail. 
POINT III INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
Technically I should have to defend myself only against 
the statute charged (UCA 41-2-124), which applies only to a 
"Licensee11. I have already shown that I am not a "licensee" 
and therefore without the scope of this statute. But, since 
I have been convicted of, and sentenced for, a crime called 
DRIVING WITHOUT A VALID DRIVERS LICENSE. I feel that I must 
address that issue as well. First let me emphatically declare 
that I am not guilty of any such crime! I am not a driver and 
therefore do not need a drivers license. More specifically, 
on the occasion which precipitated this case, I was not DRIVING 
WITHOUT A VALID DRIVERS LICENSE! 
A proper analysis of this issue requires that we precisely 
define the terms used in connection with this accused crime. 
As will be shown, numerous term used today do not, in their 
legal context, mean what many assume they mean, thus resulting 
in misapplication of law and statute, as in the instant case. 
Take for example the term "DRIVER" which Bovierfs Law Dictionary 
defines as: 
"Driver One employed in conducting a coach, carriagef 
wagon, or other vehicle..." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 
Ed., pg 540. 
Note that by definition this term refers to one who is 
"employed" in conducting a vehicle. That is one who is hired, 
which implies a request and contract for compensation, to conduct 
a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle. Said another way, 
a driver is one carrying on his business for profit and gain 
upon the roads and highways. 
Not everyone who travels upon the roads and highways in 
a vehicle is doing so for profit and gain and therefore driving. 
In fact the primary and preferred use of the state highways 
(the main purpose for which they were constructed) is for private 
use; that is the private individual exercising his inalienable 
right to travel. The higher US Courts have held that this 
personal right is not to be tampered with or deprived. 
"The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways 
and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage 
or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city 
may prohibit or permit at will, but a common right which 
he has under the right to life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness." Thompson v Smith, 154 SE 579. 
"The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and 
transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common 
fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot 
rightfully be deprived." Chicago Motor Coach v Chicago, 
169 NE 221. 
If, as these Supreme Courts have declared, the private 
citizen's right to travel cannot be deprived or prohibited, 
can he be required to be licensed to travel? The answer to 
this question first requires a definition of the term license 
which by court ruling is defined as: 
"The permission, by competent authority to do an act which, 
without such permission, would be illegal, a trespass, 
or a tort.11 People v Henderson, 218 NW 2d, 4. 
"Leave to do a thing which licenser could prevent." 
Western Electric Co v Pacent Reproduction Corp. 42 F 
2d. 116,118. 
A simple example demonstrating the proper use of this term is 
the situation where a man has need of a shovel and wants to 
use his neighbors. If he first obtains his neighbors permission 
or license he is justified in using the tool, but if he uses 
it absent permission or license he is committing a tort or theft. 
On the other hand, if he has a shovel of his own, he need ask 
no ones license to use it, but may do so at will without outside 
interference. He cannot steal that which is his; nor can anyone 
else, including the state, assume power to regulate his use 
of his own property, as long as he does not damage another's1 
person or property in the course of that use. 
Now, in answer to the above posed question; can the private 
citizen be required to be licensed to travel? The answer is 
a resounding and absolute NO; because, as previously defined, 
the power to license is the power to prevent or deprive and 
the citizen cannot rightfully be deprived of his right to travel 
(Chicago Motor Coach v Chicago supra). It is important to 
observe here that the State of Utah does not require travelers 
licensesf to do so would be a deprivation or restriction of 
a public and individual right. However, the state does issue 
and require drivers licenses for drivers because driving on 
the public roads and highways would be illegal, a trespass, 
or a tort otherwise. The Supreme Courts explain it thusly: 
11
 ...for while the citizen has the right to travel upon 
the public highways and to transport his property thereon, 
that right does not extend to the use of the highways, 
either in whole or in part as a place for private gain. 
For the latter purpose no person has a vested right to 
use the highways of the State but is a privilege or license 
which the legislature may grant or withhold at its 
discretion." State v Johnson 243 P. 1073; Cummins v Holms 
155 P 171. 
"The streets belong to the public and are primarily for 
the use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for 
the purposes of gain is special and extraordinary andf 
generally at leastf may be prohibited or conditioned as 
the legislature deems proper." Packard v Benton 284 US 
140f 144. 
"....it is well established law that the highways of the 
state are public property; that their primary and preferred 
use is for private purposes; and that their use for purposes 
of gain is special and extraordinary, which...the 
legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit." 
Stevenson v Binford 287 US 251. 
To make this point perfectly clear so that there is no 
misunderstanding the distinction between one traveling as a 
matter of right and one driving upon the public highways for 
profit or gain, I quote Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court 
of the State of Washington: 
"The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and 
to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course 
of life and business, differs radically and obviously from 
that of one who make the highway his place of business 
and uses it for private gain....The former is the usual 
and ordinary right of the citizen, an common right, a right 
common to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and 
extraordinary... This distinction, elementary, and 
fundamental in character, is recognized by all the 
authorities." State v City of Spokane, 186 P 2d 82. 
With this legal distinction fresh in mind, it is plain 
to see that for one to commit the tortious act, DRIVING WITHOUT 
A VALID DRIVERS LICENSE, he must use the public right-of-ways 
(highways and roads) for personal enrichment (profit and gain) 
at the public's expense; which act is unjust and illegal except 
with special permission or license from the public or their 
representative (government). Before a proper guilty ruling 
by a court is entered against one so accused, the prosecution 
must enter sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt 
that the accused did indeed use the public road or highway for 
profit and gain (drive), and that he had no valid permission 
to do so (drivers license). 
In the case at hand the prosecution presented no evidence 
that I was using the road for profit or gain. The Officerfs 
testimony indicated that I may have been in a vehicle on the 
highway sometime that morning, but does not indicate in what 
capacity that may have been. Evidence was entered showing that 
I do not have a valid drivers license, which I readily admit 
because, as I have stated before, I do not drive (conduct 
business for profit upon the public right of ways), and therefore 
have no need for a drivers license. 
For this obvious lack of evidence and consequent failure 
of the prosecutor to carry the burden of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt, the guilty finding of the Circuit Court is clearly in 
error and should be reversed. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
As the court reviews the pleadings and proceedings of this 
case, it will be readily apparent that I am not a professional 
at law. Some of my pleadings may have been off point and 
irrelevant. Many times during the trial I was several steps 
behind the judge and prosecution trying to understand what was 
just said or done, thereby missing the present action. I admit 
to this lack of finesse and experience, but I have tried in 
this brief to clear out those distractions and focus on the 
substantial issues of merit. A truly objective, impartial 
analysis of the facts, proceedings, and law will show that the 
Circuit Court Judge did err on three counts: 
First, that he proceeded to assume jurisdiction, and did not 
follow RCP Rule 8(d), but took the role of prosecutor as if 
this were an inquisitorial judicial system rather than the more 
just adversary system with an independent magistrate 
Second, that he ignored the obvious fact that UCA 41-2-124 refers 
specifically to persons who have entered into the drivers 
licensing contract with the State, namely a LICENSEE, and that 
I, by personal declaration and by accepted evidence, am not 
such a person or licensee. 
Thirdy that he erroneously assumed that evidence indicating 
I was in a vehicle on the highway proves that I was driving, 
when the High Courts of this country have many times in many 
ways declared that there is a clear distinction between one 
traveling by right and one driving for profit and gain; that 
the former being a right cannot be denied, and the latter being 
a privilege is subject to licensing. 
For these just reasons the Circuit Court ruling should 
be reversed and all penalties and fines dismissed. 
Dated this jf day of January, 1990 
Budd Iverson 
Appellant in Proper Person 
STATE OF UTAH 
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NORMAN H BANGERTER GOVERNOR JOHN T NIELSEN COMMISSIONER 
0 DOUGLAS BODRERO DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
ADDENDUM 
LSHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
> n l 2 4 , 1989 
RE: 
DOB: 
Bud I v e r s o n 
07 -22 -22 
TO WHOM I T MAY CONCERN: 
This is to certify that our records do not show traffic violations that 
are more than eight years oldl The records further show no indication 
that the above individual is presently licensed to drive in the State of 
Utah. However, his/her driving privilege is not under suspension or 
revocation with this Department at this time. 
Therefore, on 03-20-89 this individual's driving status was valid 
and clear to apply for a Utah driver license. 
3RIVEH UC£*S£ CMSICN 
AS CUSTODIAN OF THE OFFICIAL SEAL FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, DRIVER LICENSE 
DIVISION, I CERTIFY THAT ALL ENCLOSED DOCUMENTS 
ARE TRUE, COMPLETE AND CORRECT COPIES AS 
CONTAINED WITHIN THE FILES OF THIS DEPARTMENT. 
** ** J' ^J>r>r y2- DATE: 9 Q'S-S'y 
CERTIFICATE OF. SERUICE 
I, Budd Iverson, do hereby certify that on this i3 day 
of January, 1990, I did post one true and complete copy of 
the foregoing document addressed to Eric A. Ludlow, Hall of 
Justice, EEO North EOO East, St. George, Utah B4770; and one 
origional and seven true and complete copies addressed to 
Utah Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, E30 South 500 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah B410E, with the US Postal Service. 
Budd Iverson 
